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I 
INTRODUCTION 
In his classic study of federal economic policy, The Fiscal Revolution in 
America,1 Herbert Stein offered a telling comparison. In 1931, faced with rising 
unemployment and a growing budget deficit, President Herbert Hoover 
proposed a tax increase. In 1962, faced with similar (if less acute) conditions, 
President John F. Kennedy proposed a tax reduction. 
This contrast reveals a sea change in American political economy. Between 
the late 1920s and the early 1960s, economists and political leaders changed the 
way they thought about taxes, spending, and the impact of each on the national 
economy. As a group, they embraced “domesticated Keynesianism,” a 
particular type of compensatory fiscal policy designed to regulate the business 
cycle.2 
As the name implies, domesticated Keynesianism drew its inspiration from 
the work of John Maynard Keynes, especially his 1936 treatise, The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money.3 But it represented a distinctly 
American interpretation of the Keynesian canon. Domesticated Keynesianism 
emphasized the use of automatic stabilizers (like a relatively stable tax system), 
rather than active manipulation of revenue and spending decisions. In addition, 
domesticated Keynesianism paid homage (more symbolic than substantive) to 
the political shibboleth of a “balanced budget,” albeit one balanced at a 
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 1. HERBERT STEIN, THE FISCAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA (2d rev. ed. 1996). 
 2. Fiscal policy has been variously defined by different authors, but this article adopts Stein’s 
definition: “policy about the large aggregates in the budget—total expenditures and total receipts and 
the difference between them—as directed toward affecting certain overall characteristics of the 
economy, such as employment and unemployment, price levels, and the total share of government 
activity in the economy.” Id. at 4. 
 3. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND 
MONEY (1936). 
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theoretical level of “full” or “high” employment rather than one balanced in the 
actual economic conditions prevailing each fiscal year.4 
The history of Keynesianism, in all its variants, has been told many times. 
But most studies—especially those focused on the early years of the fiscal 
revolution—have emphasized the spending side of the fiscal equation, giving 
short shrift to the important role of taxation.5 The reasons for this relative 
neglect are both obvious and puzzling. They were obvious because early 
champions of compensatory fiscal policy were themselves inclined to downplay 
the role of taxation. Federal taxes in the 1930s were either too narrow (income 
taxes that burdened only the rich) or too unwieldy (myriad excise taxes paid by 
millions of consumers) to play an effective role in compensatory policy. 
Expansionary tax cuts—an element of countercyclical policy that we now take 
for granted—were hard, if not impossible, to engineer before the advent of a 
broad-based, flexible revenue instrument like the modern income tax that 
emerged during World War II. 
But the neglect is puzzling given the political salience of taxation during the 
Great Depression. No issue did more to estrange Franklin Roosevelt from 
wealthy Americans and leaders of the U.S. business community. And no issue 
was more responsible for the New Deal’s political problems in the late 1930s, 
when a tax-driven backlash put an end to Roosevelt’s ambitions for structural 
economic reform and gave a boost to less contentious Keynesian schemes for 
managing the economy.6 Even more important, the particular version of 
countercyclical fiscal policy that proved ascendant in American politics—Stein’s 
domesticated Keynesianism—relied principally on taxation, rather than 
spending, to manage the vicissitudes of the business cycle. 
To understand the rise of domesticated Keynesianism, we need a better 
history of revenue Keynesianism: the distinctive role of taxation within a larger 
program of compensatory fiscal policy. This article explores the early history of 
compensatory taxation, focusing not on the era of its intellectual and political 
maturity after World War II, but on its relative infancy during the 1930s.7 It 
 
 4. STEIN, supra note 1, at 518. 
 5. Stein’s book is an exception to the rule of revenue neglect: he gives substantial attention to tax 
policy through his story, even arguing that the growing acceptance of taxation as an instrument of 
countercyclical fiscal policy was a key part of the fiscal revolution. But even Stein gives the subject less 
attention than it deserves, especially as tax policy developed during the early years of the fiscal 
revolution. 
 6. Literature on the post-1937 embrace of Keynesian fiscal policy is abundant. For two of the 
most useful and relatively recent contributions, see WILLIAM J. BARBER, DESIGNS WITHIN 
DISORDER: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, THE ECONOMISTS, AND THE SHAPING OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC POLICY, 1933–1945, at 80–115 (1996); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW 
DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR 65–105 (1995). 
 7. On the overall history of New Deal taxes, see MARK HUGH LEFF, THE LIMITS OF SYMBOLIC 
REFORM: THE NEW DEAL AND TAXATION, 1933–1939 (1984); Walter Lambert, New Deal Revenue 
Acts (1970) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas). 
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gives special attention to debates within the tax-policy community, a loose 
grouping of fiscal experts whose influence on the fiscal revolution was pivotal.8 
As it turns out, compensatory taxation found a receptive audience in the tax 
community of the 1930s. Though it took more than thirty years for 
domesticated Keynesianism to win the hearts and minds of politicians, revenue 
Keynesianism swept the tax community in less than a decade. The conversion of 
the experts was most obvious within the Treasury Department, where tax 
economists moved from skepticism to enthusiasm in just three years. This 
shift—prompted by a confluence of intellectual theory and economic reality—
was more or less complete by 1938. And by the early 1940s, it had found 
concrete expression in the wartime tax regime—a distinctive system of taxation 
that remains largely intact even today.9 
II 
THE PROMISE OF COMPENSATORY FISCAL POLICY 
Compensatory fiscal policy—tax hikes during booms followed by tax cuts 
during busts—had champions long before John Maynard Keynes laid claim to 
the idea in the mid-1930s. While balanced budgets remained an article of faith 
for most elected officials, economists were more flexible in their definition of 
“sound” fiscal policy. Between 1929 and 1932, a number of leading scholars 
endorsed expansionary fiscal policy, including the deliberate use of federal 
deficits to encourage recovery. Ultimately, however, such arguments failed to 
persuade President Hoover and congressional leaders, who cooperated to pass 
the deflationary Revenue Act of 1932 at the very nadir of the Depression. 
A.  Public Spending to Combat Recession 
Many political and business leaders of the 1920s believed that government 
had a useful role to play in fighting recessions and curbing unemployment.10 
They placed particular faith in the efficacy of increased spending on public 
works.11 New dams, roads, and tunnels might prove to be long-term public 
 
 8. On the notion of a tax-policy community and its importance to the policy process, see JULIAN 
E. ZELIZER, TAXING AMERICA 8–11 (1998). 
 9. On the notion of tax regimes, see W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: 
A SHORT HISTORY 2 (2d ed. 2004). 
 10. STEIN, supra note 1, at 10. Political leaders sometimes distinguished between these two goals, 
since the latter often implied a range of humanitarian concerns not necessarily included in worries 
about cyclical downturns. 
 11. See generally NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, BUSINESS CYCLES AND 
UNEMPLOYMENT xxvii–xxix, passim (1st ed. 1923) (committee report of President Harding’s 1921 
conference on unemployment, supervised by Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover), available at 
http://www.nber.org/books/comm23-1; Georg Bielschowsky, Business Fluctuations and Public Works, 
44 Q.J. ECON. 286 (1930); F.G. Dickinson, Public Construction and Cyclical Unemployment, 139 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. i (1928); Leo Wolman et al., Public Works and Unemployment, 
20 AM. ECON. REV. 15 (1930). For skeptical assessments of the countercyclical utility of public-works 
spending (emphasizing problems of timing and scale), see ALVIN H. HANSEN, ECONOMIC 
THORNDIKE 9/4/2010 11:15:04 AM 
98 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:95 
assets, but in the short run, they also promoted recovery by supporting wage 
levels, which in turn increased consumption and encouraged growth. As 
President Hoover explained while urging business leaders to continue their 
own, private-sector construction during the early years of the Depression, 
“These measures will provide employment, enlarge buying power, increase the 
circulation of money, create markets for farms and factories, and assure 
prosperity and contented homes.”12 
As the United States plunged into the economic abyss in late 1929, 
President Hoover focused initially on state and local building projects, as well as 
on private-sector construction by utilities, railroads, and other businesses. The 
federal government, he believed, should promote and coordinate these efforts 
to maximize economic benefits.13 This approach reflected Hoover’s conception 
of the associational state: a vision of modern, scientific governance that 
emphasized public–private cooperation, rather than purely governmental 
solutions.14 Under pressure from rival politicians and interest groups, however, 
Hoover also agreed to increase and accelerate public-works spending. He won 
approval from Congress for roughly $200 million in additional spending during 
1930 and 1931—a significant increase, but well short of the mammoth programs 
urged by some true believers in the efficacy of public-works spending, who 
urged programs in the range of $1 billion to $6 billion.15 Moreover, the increase 
was dwarfed by the decline in private-sector construction spending, which 
dropped by $2.7 billion between 1929 and 1930.16 
B.  Politicians and the Importance of Balanced Budgets 
Even given the modest size of Hoover’s spending program, budget watchers 
worried about how to pay for it. Economists generally agreed that debt finance 
was the only plausible answer: expenditures were too large and revenues too 
 
STABILIZATION IN AN UNBALANCED WORLD 186–89 (1932); Sumner H. Slichter, The Economics of 
Public Works, 24 AM. ECON. REV. 177 (1934). 
 12. Quoted in STEIN, supra note 1, at 9. Hoover hoped that private-sector construction, when 
combined with an expanded federal public-works program, would stem job losses and turn the 
economy around. Stein observed that while Hoover’s understanding of public-works spending did not 
reflect any sort of sophisticated proto-Keynesian theory of income determination, it was probably good 
enough for government work. Id. 
 13. Id. at 20. As Hoover declared in his 1929 State of the Union address, 
I have, therefore, instituted systematic, voluntary measures of cooperation with the business 
institutions and with State and municipal authorities to make certain that fundamental 
businesses of the country shall continue as usual, that wages and therefore consuming power 
shall not be reduced, and that a special effort shall be made to expand construction work in 
order to assist in equalizing other deficits in employment. 
President Herbert Hoover, State of the Union (Dec. 3, 1929), available at http:// 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22021. 
 14. For the seminal exploration of Hoover’s associational ideology, see Ellis W. Hawley, Herbert 
Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an “Associative State,” 1921–1928, 61 J. AM. HIST. 
116 (1974). 
 15. STEIN, supra note 1, at 23–24. 
 16. Id. at 21–22. 
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small to pay for emergency spending on a current basis.17 But this academic 
recognition hardly conferred a license to borrow on Hoover and the Congress. 
Economic theory competed with political reality as lawmakers tried to reconcile 
expansionary spending with traditional notions of fiscal responsibility. 
For politicians in both parties—not to mention businessmen, journalists, and 
the general public—balanced budgets were an article of faith.18 From 1920 to 
1930, receipts had exceeded expenditures every year, sometimes by a large 
margin.19 That fiscal record was held in high esteem by almost everyone. “That 
policy of a balanced budget—expenditures within receipts—must not be 
molested,” intoned President Calvin Coolidge as he prepared to leave office in 
early 1928. “It must not be endangered. The great good which has come to this 
country from a balanced budget is too measureless, too far-reaching, even to 
suggest any other course.”20 
President Hoover agreed. “I am confident that the sentiment of the people 
is in favor of a balanced Budget,” he said in December 1930. “I am equally 
confident that the influence on business of having the financial affairs of the 
Federal Government on a sound basis is of the utmost importance.”21 Even John 
Nance Garner, Democratic Speaker of the House, lent his support to the 
traditional notions of sound budget policy. “It has come to a point now where 
the worst kind of taxes are better than no taxes at all,” he declared in March 
1932. “The budget must be balanced.”22 
In general, the guardians of fiscal probity insisted that balanced budgets 
were essential to “business confidence,” another elusive but powerful notion. 
Confidence, in turn, was widely considered the wellspring of economic growth 
and the guarantor of prosperity. “Business confidence may, in fact, be 
considered the hub on which all the factors in the trade cycle turn,” declared 
one economist in 1923. “The community acts according to its expectations of 
the future, and the action taken is almost invariably such as to bring about the 
effect anticipated.”23 
Such broad, bipartisan fealty to the notion of a balanced budget masked 
considerable flexibility in practice. When it came to real-world politics, 
balanced budgets were not an iron law. Accounting standards allowed for 
 
 17. Id. at 11. 
 18. On the history and political importance of balanced-budget ideologies, see DENNIS S. 
IPPOLITO, WHY BUDGETS MATTER: BUDGET POLICY AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2003); JAMES D. 
SAVAGE, BALANCED BUDGETS AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1988). 
 19. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES 
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR  2010, at 21 (2009). 
 20. President Calvin Coolidge, Address at the Fourteenth Regular Meeting of the Business 
Organization of the Government, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 30, 1928), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ 
ws/?pid=444. 
 21. President Herbert Hoover, Annual Budget Message to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1932 (Dec. 3, 
1930), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=22459. 
 22. Garner Will Take Floor Today to Lead Fights for Tax Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1932, at 1. 
 23. J.R. Bellerby, The Controlling Factor in Trade Cycles, 33 ECON. J. 305, 319 n.1 (1923). 
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considerable flexibility in the treatment of certain expenditures (including 
public-works spending), as well as the treatment of debt repayment. Even more 
important, many political leaders, including Hoover, recognized that sound 
finance did not require that budgets be balanced every year. Rather, deficits 
incurred during a dip in the business cycle were unobjectionable if they were 
offset (in fairly short order) by surpluses during prosperous years.24 
Still, policymakers felt compelled to seek budget balance and to explain 
deviations from the ideal. In 1931, a substantial deficit prompted much 
handwringing in Washington, and with an even larger shortfall looming for the 
following year, policymakers in both parties agreed to raise taxes.25 
C.  Economists and the Utility of Deficit Finance 
Many economists endorsed the drive for a tax hike, insisting that it was 
necessary to preserve fiscal soundness. Indeed, most of the discipline’s 
established leaders were committed to the importance of balanced budgets and 
attuned to the dangers of deficit finance.26 But these fiscal traditionalists faced a 
growing number of skeptical colleagues, who argued that unbalanced budgets 
could be a useful tonic for an ailing economy. A preference for expansionary 
fiscal policy—especially on the spending side of the ledger—was relatively 
common among academic economists of the late 1920s and early 1930s.27 As one 
economist later recalled of the early Depression years, “the idea [of 
countercyclical fiscal policy] was then a commonplace in my academic 
surroundings of the time.”28 
Expansionary fiscal policy was particularly popular among members of the 
“Chicago School”—a group of like-minded economists that emerged at the 
University of Chicago during the 1920s and 1930s. Best known during the latter 
half of the twentieth century for its free-market sensibility and monetarist 
proclivity, the Chicago School was originally less doctrinaire. Indeed, several of 
its founders were receptive to government interventionism, at least when it 
came to fiscal policy in a depression. While they still generally agreed that 
budgets should be balanced over the length of the business cycle, they insisted 
 
 24. STEIN, supra note 1, at 26–29. 
 25. On the Revenue Act of 1932, see ROY G. BLAKEY & GLADYS C. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL 
INCOME TAX 301–34 (1940); RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 149–62 (1954); 
Jordan A. Schwarz, John Nance Garner and the Sales Tax Rebellion of 1932, 30 J. S. HIST. 162 (1964); 
Lambert, supra note 7. 
 26. Robert W. Dimand, The New Economics and American Economists in the 1930s Reconsidered, 
18 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 42, 42 (1990); Economists Advise Credit ‘Expansion,’ N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1932, 
at 30. For a particularly influential critique of expansionary spending, see R.G. Hawtrey, Public 
Expenditure and Trade Depression, 96 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 438, 438 (1933). 
 27. STEIN, supra note 1, at 9–10. Even some early monetarists, like Irving Fisher, made room for 
deficits in their prescriptions for recovery, since they viewed debt-financed spending as a method of 
monetary expansion. See BARBER, supra note 6, at 84. 
 28. Jacob Viner, Comment on My 1936 Review of Keynes’ General Theory, in KEYNES’ GENERAL 
THEORY: REPORTS OF THREE DECADES 263 (Robert Lekachman ed., 1964). 
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that debt-financed public spending could stimulate aggregate demand and 
encourage recovery.29 
No less an authority than Milton Friedman acknowledged as much. In an 
article exploring the early work of Henry Simons—the leading light of 1930s 
economics and cofounder of the Chicago School—Friedman remarked on the 
“great similarity between the views expressed by Simons and by Keynes—as to 
the causes of the Great Depression, the impotence of monetary policy, and the 
need to rely extensively on fiscal policy.”30 As early as 1933, Simons had 
recognized the need for expansionary fiscal policy—including new spending and 
targeted tax cuts—to help raise prices and reverse the downturn.31 
Simons, moreover, was not alone. In May 1932, his Chicago colleague Frank 
H. Knight assured Senator Robert Wagner that deficits were appropriate in the 
midst of a depression. “As far as I know, economists are completely agreed that 
the Government should spend as much and tax as little as possible, at a time 
such as this,” he wrote, “using the expenditure in the way to do the most good 
in itself and also to point toward relieving the depression.”32 
Perhaps most important, Chicago economist Jacob Viner emerged as a vocal 
champion of expansionary fiscal policy in the early 1930s.33 Viner’s opinion 
merits attention not simply because he was a leading figure of his discipline, but 
also because he played a vital role in the early New Deal, advising Treasury 
Secretary Henry Morgenthau on a range of issues, including fiscal policy. In 
1931, Viner complained to his colleagues that Hoover’s Treasury Department 
was pursuing “traditional policy, based on so-called sound principles of finance, 
of taxing heavily, spending lightly, and redeeming debts.”34 Such an approach 
was steeped in tradition but ultimately misguided. Better, Viner said, to follow 
an opposite policy: taxing lightly, spending heavily, and borrowing the money to 
finance both.35 “When business activity is declining, or is stagnant and at a low 
level,” he contended, “increased expenditures, reduced taxation, and budget 
deficits are, from the point of view of the national economy as a whole, sound 
policy rather than unsound.”36 
 
 29. For arguments challenging the notion of a unitary “Chicago School”—and seeking to replace it 
with a pair of intellectual traditions located at the University—see M. Bronfenbrenner, Observations on 
The “Chicago School(s),” 70 J. POL. ECON. 72 (1962); H. Laurence Miller, Jr., On the “Chicago School 
of Economics,” 70 J. POL. ECON. 64 (1962); Eugene Rotwein, Jacob Viner and the Chicago Tradition, 
15 HIST. POL. ECON. 265 (1983). 
 30. Milton Friedman, The Monetary Theory and Policy of Henry Simons, 10 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7 
(1967). 
 31. Id. at 8. 
 32. 75 CONG. REC. 10323 (1932). 
 33. Rotwein, supra note 29, at 272. 
 34. REPORT OF THE ROUND TABLES AND GENERAL CONFERENCES AT THE ELEVENTH SESSION 
182 (Arthur Howland Buffington ed., 1931) (hereinafter REPORT OF THE ROUND TABLES). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.; see also JACOB VINER, BALANCED DEFLATION, INFLATION, OR MORE DEPRESSION 24 
(1933). 
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Indeed, Viner urged policymakers to simply embrace the need for price 
inflation. Higher prices would restore profits and encourage business activity, 
he insisted. And the easiest way to inflate prices was through deliberate deficits. 
“[T]he simplest and least objectionable procedure would be for the federal 
government to increase its expenditures or to decrease its taxes,” he wrote in 
1933, “and to finance the resultant excess of expenditures over tax issues either 
by the issue of legal tender greenbacks or by borrowing from the banks.”37 
In 1932 and 1933, Viner joined his Chicago colleagues in urging 
policymakers to adopt a more expansionary fiscal policy, including additional 
debt-financed spending. “[I]nflationary expenditures would be handsomely 
rewarded in greater production, larger employment and higher tax revenues,” 
they declared in a 1932 letter to congressional leaders. “These expenditures 
would be financed by large-scale sale of Government bonds to the Federal 
Reserve Banks or by issuance of greenbacks.”38 Viner and his colleagues took 
special care to argue against timidity in price policy: “parsimonious inflation,” 
they advised, “is an illusory economy.”39 
Such thinking was not universal among American economists in the late 
1920s and early 1930s. But neither was it heretical. Compensatory fiscal policy, 
including a preference for deficit finance, had developed a strong following as 
the nation approached the worst years of the Depression. 
D.  Triumph of the Traditionalists 
President Hoover’s initial response to the stock-market crash included a tax 
cut, but it was not conceived as an expansionary or deliberately inflationary 
measure. Rather, the 1929 tax reduction was intended to bolster confidence, 
that watchword of politicians fighting downturns in every era. Hoover and his 
advisers hoped that a tax cut would signal their own confidence that Wall 
Street’s crash was immaterial to the nation’s broader economic health—
including its tax revenues. Money would continue to flow into the Treasury, and 
budgets would remain balanced. 
 
 37. VINER, supra note 36, at 24–28. Viner understood that deficits provoked fear in many circles. 
But he believed such worries were misplaced. He reassured one colleague by recalling the words of 
Adam Smith: 
When, during the American Revolutionary War, a young friend, Sir John Sinclair, lamented to 
[Smith] the misfortunes, presumably financial, in which the war was involving Britain, and 
exclaimed, “If we go on at this rate, the nation must be ruined!”, Adam Smith replied, “Be 
assured, my young friend, that there is a great deal of ruin in a nation.” 
JACOB VINER, THE LONG VIEW AND THE SHORT: STUDIES IN ECONOMIC THEORY AND POLICY 114 
(1958). Viner believed that American public finance could tolerate an episode of “ruinous” deficit 
spending. Indeed, he believed it was necessary. But he did worry about the potential for political misuse 
of countercyclical fiscal policy. Many politicians, he observed, were inclined to replace the old dogma of 
budget balance with a new one of spendthrift fiscalism. “[T]he long view tells me that while this may 
not be the road to ruin,” Viner warned, “it at least blazes a trail to it.” Id. at 115. 
 38. Economists Offer Plan to Aid Nation, WASH. POST, May 24, 1932, at 5. 
 39. Id. 
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In other words, Hoover cut taxes not because the country needed it, but to 
signal that it didn’t. “The action of the government today,” wrote one reporter 
commenting on the tax cut, “was taken as still another means of assuring the 
nation that the government was satisfied that business was on such a firm basis 
that revenues will continue to assure a comfortable surplus.”40 
The 1929 tax cut, of course, did nothing to slow the economy’s death spiral. 
The budget did remain balanced for 1930, but it slipped into deficit the next 
year. And with that deficit came a resurgence of fiscal traditionalism. 
Economists had failed to convince Hoover or almost anyone else in Washington 
that deficits could be a useful tonic. Instead, political leaders coalesced around 
the idea of a tax hike—and not the sort of tax hike counseled by the economists. 
Debate over the Revenue Act of 1932 was vigorous. Republicans, who 
controlled the Senate, sparred with Democrats, who controlled the House of 
Representatives. Leaders of both parties fought with President Hoover, who 
was mired in his losing campaign for re-election. Perhaps most striking, 
Democrats found themselves torn apart by a rebellion in their own ranks. Eager 
to claim the mantle of fiscal responsibility, party leaders had been gulled into 
supporting a new federal sales tax (long a favorite of Republicans). But rank 
and file party members, led by North Carolina Representative Robert “Muley” 
Doughton from the Ways and Means Committee, had defeated the plan on the 
House floor.41 
Even sales-tax foes, however, were generally resigned to the need for a tax 
hike. On its face, the impulse seems puzzling, since policymakers understood 
what the economists were telling them: tax hikes might very well slow the 
process of economic recovery, not speed it up. But officials had to balance that 
knowledge against other concerns. Large and persistent deficits, they feared, 
might cause long-term interest rates to rise, hampering recovery. Also, deficits 
might frighten business leaders, who would react by hoarding cash rather than 
investing it. Perhaps most important, deficits might undermine international 
confidence in the dollar and exacerbate the outflow of gold from government 
coffers—a process already underway and contributing to the Federal Reserve’s 
new tight-money policy.42 
When judged in context, then, the bipartisan decision to raise taxes was not 
unreasonable, even if it quickly proved unwise. The resulting legislation, the 
Revenue Act of 1932, imposed the single largest peacetime tax hike in 
 
 40. Mellon Outlines Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1929, at 1. For more on the 1929 tax cut, see Joseph 
J. Thorndike, Tax Cuts, Confidence, and Presidential Leadership, 120 TAX NOTES 1205 (2008). Many 
observers were not buying what Hoover was selling. The tax cut, the Nation magazine declared, was a 
transparent ploy to bolster confidence, and an unconvincing one at that. “[N]otwithstanding the 
supporting figures given out,” the magazine said, “the change in the Treasury’s tax plans at this time 
cannot be defended on fiscal grounds.” Business to the Rescue, 129 NATION 651, 651–52 (1929). 
 41. Schwarz, supra note 25, at 166–69. 
 42. W. Elliot Brownlee, Tax Regimes, National Crisis, and State-Building in America, in FUNDING 
THE MODERN AMERICAN STATE, 1941–1995: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE ERA OF EASY FINANCE 
72–73 (W. Elliot Brownlee ed., 1996); STEIN, supra note 1, at 34–38. 
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American history to that point.43 At the time of its passage, it was predicted to 
raise $1.1 billion in new revenue, including $457 million from a broad array of 
new, and generally regressive, excise taxes on consumer goods—exactly the 
taxes that most economists urged lawmakers to avoid.44 To be sure, the law 
raised progressive taxes, too, including the personal income tax. But with the 
sharp economic downturn—and the extremely narrow base of the income tax—
such levies alone could not raise enough money to close the yawning budget 
gap. 
After its passage, commentators in the press hailed the Revenue Act of 1932 
as a milestone in fiscal probity. Lawmakers, not surprisingly, were quick to pat 
themselves on the back. But as some observers warned—and later analysts 
confirmed45—the law promised to slow recovery, not speed it. Indeed, if the 
1932 tax act was any sort of milestone, it was a marker on the long detour from 
depression to prosperity by way of misplaced austerity.46 
III 
THE CASE FOR COMPENSATORY TAXATION AND ITS NEW DEAL SKEPTICS 
Over the course of the early 1930s, economists built a case for compensatory 
fiscal policy. Expansionary spending had plenty of adherents,47 and it found a 
prominent place in the early New Deal when the National Industrial Recovery 
Act authorized $3.3 billion in new-construction spending. Numerous observers 
endorsed the effort, if not the implementation. Most notably, sympathetic 
criticism came from John Maynard Keynes, who chastised President Roosevelt 
in an open letter in late 1933 for moving too slowly to expand government 
spending.48 
Over the course of the 1920s, Keynes had emerged as a supporter of 
compensatory fiscal policy, including the use of public works to stimulate 
economic growth. In general, he preferred private to public investment, arguing 
that monetary and credit policy were the first line of defense when trying to 
cope with a slump. But when business confidence reached a nadir, these 
traditional tools of economic stabilization could prove inadequate.49 At that 
point, Keynes argued, expansionary fiscal policy had a key role to play. 
“Government investment will break the vicious circle,” he said. “If you can do 
 
 43. Brownlee, supra note 42, at 73. 
 44. Id. 
 45. E. Cary Brown, Fiscal Policy in the ’Thirties: A Reappraisal, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 857, 863–66 
(1956). 
 46. See id. at 868–69 (discussing the deflationary impact of the 1932 revenue law). 
 47. See COLUM. UNIV. COMM’N, ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION 35–37 (1934) for a particularly 
influential example of professional economic opinion. 
 48. John Maynard Keynes, From Keynes to Roosevelt: Our Recovery Plan Assayed, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 31, 1933, available at http://www.naomiklein.org/files/resources/pdfs/keynes-roosevelt-1933.pdf. 
Much of Keynes’ more scholarly work carried the same policy implications. See, e.g., QUINCY WRIGHT 
ET AL., UNEMPLOYMENT AS A WORLD-PROBLEM 25 (1931). 
 49. STEIN, supra note 1, at 133–41. 
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that for a couple of years, it will have the effect, if my diagnosis is right, of 
restoring business profits more nearly to normal, and if that can be achieved, 
then private enterprise will be revived.”50 By 1933, Keynes was firmly convinced 
that government spending was vital to recovery.51 
Meanwhile, expansionary taxation also won a following, as a handful of 
economists and public intellectuals suggested that tax cuts could promote 
recovery just as effectively as spending increases. After all, it was the deficit that 
mattered, not the means to it. A few champions of compensatory taxation even 
developed an argument for expansionary tax hikes. Building on economic 
insights about the marginal propensity to consume, they contended that heavy 
taxes on the rich could liberate purchasing power locked away in private 
hoards. 
Nonetheless, skeptics of compensatory taxation remained legion, especially 
in the corridors of power. In particular, the New Deal Treasury proved to be a 
bastion of traditional thinking on fiscal policy, more or less impervious to 
charms of the “new economics.” While inclined to support progressive taxation 
on fairness grounds, the department’s tax experts found little to like in broader 
arguments for compensatory taxation. 
A.  The Rise of Compensatory Taxation 
While advocates of compensatory fiscal policy still emphasized government 
spending, they gradually made room in their models for countercyclical tax 
policy. Economists pointed out that tax cuts would expand the nation’s 
purchasing power in much the way that spending hikes would. “[T]he 
administration has given perhaps too little attention to temporary tax reduction 
as a means toward the desired deficit,” observed members of the Commission 
of Inquiry into National Policy in International Economic Relations, a blue-
ribbon panel convened by the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in late 
1933. “In general, a deficit achieved by tax reduction is as reflationary as one 
obtained by extraordinary outlays.”52 
Keynes himself made this point the same year. In The Means to Prosperity, 
he stressed the desirability of new, loan-financed, government spending. But in 
the next breath, he also endorsed tax cuts. “For the increased spending power 
of the taxpayer will have precisely the same favourable repercussions as 
increased spending power due to loan-expenditure,” he wrote, “and in some 
ways this method of increasing expenditure is healthier and better spread 
throughout the community.”53 
 
 50. Id. at 145. 
 51. See, e.g., JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE MEANS TO PROSPERITY 9–16 (1933). 
 52. COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO NAT’L POLICY IN INT’L ECON. RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 92–93 (1934). Notably, the commission included Beardsley Ruml among its 
members and Alvin Hansen among its staff—both soon to become outspoken champions of Keynesian 
theory. 
 53. KEYNES, supra note 51, at 16. 
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The SSRC commission offered specific tax cuts for consideration. A cut in 
excise taxes would expand mass purchasing power and reduce costs for affected 
industries, the members declared. “The consequent price reductions, in the case 
of goods of wide consumption, would either markedly increase consumption 
and production directly, or leave people with larger amounts to be spent on 
other consumption goods.” Either development, they maintained, would 
promote recovery.54 
The commission anticipated that a comprehensive system of compensatory 
fiscal policy—tax hikes during booms, tax cuts during busts—might be useful on 
a continuing basis, not simply as a remedy for the current crisis. But its 
members understood the inherent difficulty of trying to manage a fast-moving 
business cycle with slow-moving fiscal tools. Whereas depression created an 
immediate need for expansionary policy, recovery would demand equally swift 
measures to prevent inflation. “The fiscal position must be kept highly flexible,” 
the panel observed, “and the administration must be prepared, legislatively and 
administratively, both for rapid scaling down of expenditures and, in an 
extremity, for the prompt imposition of new and higher taxes.”55 
A few years later, economist Joseph Schumpeter made a similar point, 
suggesting that tax policy could be used not simply as a treatment for economic 
depression, but more generally as a tool for business-cycle regulation. 
“[T]axation itself may be made a useful instrument of remedial policy if taxes 
which are in any way proportional to business success are systematically 
lowered in depression and increased in prosperity,” he wrote in January 1934, 
“in which case they would act in a way similar to that of the variations of the 
rate of interest.”56 
Such arguments were persuasive to many economists, at least in theoretical 
terms. But they elided some of the technical and administrative difficulties 
involved in “highly flexible” fiscal policy. Tax experts were more attuned to 
such concerns, yet they, too, were beginning to embrace the notion of 
compensatory taxation. In a 1935 article for The Tax Magazine, an influential 
trade journal for tax practitioners, Chicago tax lawyer and accountant George 
Altman suggested that income taxes could be used to fine countercyclical effect. 
The method, in general, would be to step up the income tax as investment, [as] its 
counterpart, prosperity, increased and to let it down as investment dropped off. In this 
way the income tax would be a counteracting force, preventing, by its increase, the 
 
 54. COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 52, at 93. 
 55. Id. at 96. 
 56. COLUM. UNIV. COMM’N, supra note 47, at 239. Part of Schumpeter’s interest in using taxes, 
rather than spending, to stimulate the economy stemmed from his suspicion of the political system. 
While “whole-heartedly agreeing” that new spending on public works and relief was important, he was 
disposed to lay greater stress on the necessity of not letting budgets go entirely to pieces, and 
of upholding the principles of careful and conscientious administration of public finances, to 
which it may be practically impossible to return when once the spirit of reckless expenditure 
has been allowed to grow up. 
Id. 
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excesses of saving and investment which break off and thereby bring on depressions; 
and permitting, by its decrease, a source and incentive for saving and investment if 
these should fall below the proper level.57 
Clearly, Altman had absorbed some lessons from the economists. But unlike 
most academic writers, he was attuned to the practical pitfalls of fiscal activism. 
He recognized, for instance, that this sort of sophisticated compensatory role 
would require careful management—more careful than lawmakers were likely 
to provide. The income tax, he counseled, should not be left to the vagaries of 
the political system. Rather, its cyclical manipulation should be entrusted to 
experts, who would adjust rates as economic circumstances changed. “If the 
rates are definitely hitched to measurable economic factors, such as 
employment and production, the task of shifting the rates may be placed in the 
hands of a purely fact-finding body,” he explained.58 
Altman’s faith in technocratic taxation was naïve: lawmakers had never 
been willing to delegate the making of tax policy, not even to the Bureau of 
Internal Revenue, which could lay claim to quite a store of tax expertise. But 
Altman thought lawmakers might jump at the chance to regulate the business 
cycle without resort to “a maze of strangling regulations.”59 Compensatory fiscal 
policy promised macroeconomic regulation with a light touch. As Altman 
observed, “The tax would allow free reign to enterprise, except that if enter- 
prise became too exuberant, it would administer the necessary admonition.”60 
B.  Progressive Taxation for Recovery 
Advocates of compensatory taxation believed lawmakers should cut taxes 
during a recession to help increase aggregate demand. But which ones? In 1934, 
more than forty-five percent of federal revenue came from an eclectic array of 
excise taxes.61 The enthusiasm of the SSRC commission notwithstanding, 
constant revision of these myriad taxes was impractical, especially since their 
incidence was uncertain and their opponents well-organized.62 
 
 57. George T. Altman, Control of the Business Cycle by Means of the Income Tax, 13 TAX MAG. 9, 
12, 54 (1935). 
 58. Id. at 54. 
 59. Id. at 55. 
 60. Id. Keynes made a similar claim to conservatism in The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money: “In some other respects the foregoing theory is moderately conservative in its 
implications. For whilst it indicates the vital importance of establishing certain central controls in 
matters which are now left in the main to individual initiative, there are wide fields of activity which are 
unaffected.” KEYNES, supra note 3, at 377–78. 
 61. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 19, at 32. 
 62. See LEFF, supra note 7, at 19–30 (discussing the politics of excise taxation in the 1930s, including 
the influence of industry groups). On the uncertain incidence of administrative difficulty of 
manipulating excise-tax rates, see GEORGE HAAS, TAX REVISION STUDIES: GENERAL STATEMENT, 
REVENUE ESTIMATES, SUMMARIES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1937), available at http:// 
www.taxhistory.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23729/23729-1.htm. 
In the case of excise taxes and customs duties, every increase or decrease in rates or coverage 
introduces an extraneous disruptive influence upon the relative competitive positions of 
different commodities and of those dealing in them. The extent to which a given increase or 
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The income tax, by contrast, was theoretically a fine tool for compensatory 
taxation—flexible and easy to manipulate through rate changes. But in the 
1930s, it was paid only by the rich, who were already inclined to oversave and 
underspend. Cutting income taxes on the rich “would serve largely to pour 
public funds into private hoards,” observed the SSRC commission.63 Worse, it 
would provide a major tax benefit to the nation’s most fortunate few, even as 
millions were plagued by privation. 
As the depression worsened, economists and tax experts expanded on the 
notion of “private hoards” to make the case for a different sort of compensatory 
tax policy: expansionary tax hikes. Basing their argument on economic theories 
about the relative propensity to consume, they suggested that higher taxes on 
the rich were not simply innocuous in the face of depression. They might, when 
properly designed, actually encourage recovery. 
When compared with their less-fortunate neighbors, rich people were less 
likely to spend their money and more likely to save it. “[W]e have to reckon 
with a tendency toward saving a progressively increasing proportion of our 
income as our income itself gets larger,” economist John M. Clark noted in the 
Columbia University report on economic reconstruction.64 If money were 
shifted from people with a low propensity to those with a high propensity to 
spend, then overall purchasing power would rise in the process.65 This concept 
was not new in the 1930s; writers like J.A. Hobson had advanced it for some 
years.66 But it took on new salience as economists tried to make sense of the 
depression and received a major boost in 1936 when Keynes gave it prominence 
in the The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. 
Keynes’s insight on consumption propensities had profound implications for 
tax policy, even if Keynes left them largely unexplored in his own work. At 
several points, he acknowledged, somewhat vaguely, that a redistribution of 
wealth by means of taxation might help boost aggregate demand. “If fiscal 
policy is used as a deliberate instrument for the more equal distribution of 
incomes,” he wrote, “its effect in increasing the propensity to consume is, of 
course, all the greater.”67 More specifically, though he generally avoided most 
specific discussion of tax policy, Keynes seemed to suggest that higher income 
and estate taxes might be a good vehicle for redistribution. 
Other economists were more inclined to tackle the issue head-on. In the 
early 1930s, for instance, Jacob Viner had pointed out that lawmakers could 
 
decrease in rates will be borne by suppliers, middle-men, or ultimate consumers, will vary 
greatly according to the relative elasticities of demand and production for the various products 
and the associated service involved. 
Id. 
 63. COMM’N OF INQUIRY, supra note 52, at 93 (discussing reductions in income taxes or estate 
taxes). 
 64. COLUM. UNIV. COMM’N, supra note 47, at 109. 
 65. Id. at 113. 
 66. David Hamilton, Hobson with a Keynesian Twist, 13 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 273, 278–79 (1954). 
 67. KEYNES, supra note 3, at 95. 
THORNDIKE 9/4/2010 11:15:04 AM 
Winter 2010] THE FISCAL REVOLUTION AND TAXATION 109 
raise taxes on the rich without endangering recovery. The money collected from 
progressive levies like the income tax, Viner noted, “otherwise would be 
hoarded and saved.”68 And hoarded money wasn’t helping anyone but the 
hoarder. If it was used to finance new spending, then the net effect was 
expansionary. 
In 1932, William Trufant Foster argued strongly for higher taxes on the rich 
as a recovery device. “[W]e must increase the incomes of those who desire to 
consume, and reduce the incomes of the very wealthy,” he advised. “We can do 
that through higher taxes upon incomes in the upper brackets, through higher 
taxes upon profits, through very much higher taxes upon inheritances.”69 
Raising taxes on the poor (as Congress actually did in the Revenue Act of 1932) 
was utterly counterproductive, even in the service of balancing the budget. “We 
thereby reduce consumption precisely when the supreme need of business is 
increased consumption.”70 Raising taxes on the rich, by contrast, would 
compensate for their propensity to oversave, thereby increasing aggregate 
demand. 
Viner’s Chicago colleague, Paul H. Douglas, made a similar point in 1935. 
Most taxes amounted to a simple transfer of purchasing power from one person 
to another, with no net change in total demand. But when lawmakers used 
progressive taxes, they could actually create new purchasing power by taking 
money from those who would not spend it and giving it to those who would.71 
“Since it is the well-to-do who have the largest hoards,” Douglas concluded, “it 
follows that while taxation as a whole is inferior during a depression to the 
other two methods of financing [borrowing or the printing of new Treasury 
notes], highly progressive income taxes are the least, and sales taxes the most 
objectionable forms of taxation which could be used.”72 
Some tax experts were inclined to agree with these arguments. “The income 
tax is like the human heart,” observed New York lawyer Charles A. Roberts in 
1931. “Business depression represents a stoppage or sluggishness of the two 
streams which are the lifeblood of commerce. The tax draws in the moneys 
which have become stagnant, and pumps them into forcible circulation in the 
stream of general buying power, restoring the vigor of our commercial life.”73 
 
 68. REPORT OF THE ROUND TABLES, supra note 34, at 183. 
 69. William Trufant Foster, Planning in a Free Country: Managed Money and Unmanaged Men, 
162 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 49, 51 (1932). 
 70. Id. 
 71. PAUL HOWARD DOUGLAS, CONTROLLING DEPRESSIONS 136 (1935). 
 72. Id. at 136–37. 
 73. Charles A. Roberts, The Income Tax and Business Recovery, 9 TAX MAG. 427, 428 (1931). 
“Whether this be just or unjust,” Roberts explained, “it is apparent that the tax moneys are taken from 
those who would have used them for expansion of productive facilities, facilities for which we have no 
immediate need. It is equally apparent that most of these moneys, when paid out by the Government, 
find their way quite promptly to men of moderate means, resulting in an expansion of the public’s 
purchasing power, for which we have the utmost need.” 
  Roberts further suggested that exemptions for the income tax should be raised, further 
narrowing its scope and making it the exclusive burden of America’s economic elite. Id. at 427, 431. 
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Roberts worried that lawmakers would shrink from the task at hand, 
delaying necessary tax hikes on wealthy Americans. 
On every hand we see a plethora of idle money and a plethora of unsalable goods 
today. This heart of trade, this money-pump, should be set to work at once. It is not 
enough to have money available at low rates. Someone must spend the money, if 
business is to revive. Armed with the power of the income tax, the Government can 
set the pace in this necessary resumption of spending.74 
Such ideas were gaining popular currency in the early 1930s. David 
Cushman Coyle—a journalist-cum-public intellectual, described as an 
“engineer, eccentric, economist”75—contended in 1933 that “[l]arge personal 
incomes are not, in fact, circulated back into the market entirely through the 
personal consumption of goods and through distribution by means of capital 
investment.” Some came back through contributions to cultural and 
philanthropic organizations. Still more was spent on personal services. And 
perhaps most important, a good deal came back by way of government 
spending.76 “What the public has failed to discern is the fact that the Federal 
Government, by its spending and fiscal policy, can distribute incomes and cause 
a large and effective increase in total buying power,” he wrote.77 
C.  New Deal Skeptics of Compensatory Taxation 
Not everyone thought taxation could function effectively as a counter- 
cyclical device, at least not in the real world. Some insisted that politics would 
get in the way, especially if lawmakers tried to raise taxes too quickly on the 
rich as part of a redistributive program.78 Others questioned whether tax 
changes of any sort—cuts as well as increases—could be implemented quickly 
enough to make a difference, especially given the size of the overall economy. 
Among those voicing such doubts were tax experts in Franklin Roosevelt’s 
Treasury Department. In the summer of 1934, Treasury Secretary Henry 
Morgenthau had commissioned a series of studies on tax reform. He brought 
Jacob Viner to Washington to assist with the project and arranged for Roswell 
Magill, a prominent New York City tax lawyer, to supervise it in his new role as 
Undersecretary of the Treasury. 
 
 74. Id. at 453. 
 75. ECONOMICS: According to Coyle, TIME, Oct. 24, 1938, at 59, available at http:// 
www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,883826,00.html. 
 76. David Cushman Coyle, New Aspects of the Distribution Problem, 165 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 109, 111 (1933). “The solution must lie in a public policy that will encourage or 
require those who might invest to refrain and to divert a large part of the savings into the market for 
services,” Cushman continued. “Obviously, the backbone of such a policy for some years to come must 
be a large program of public and semi-public projects, supported by income taxes or by large 
contributions stimulated by the tax laws.” Id. at 112. 
 77. Id. at 114–15. 
 78. See, e.g., Alvin H. Hansen, Mr. Keynes on Underemployment Equilibrium, 44 J. POL. ECON. 
667, 682 (1936) (suggesting that a program of redistribution of income through taxation “would only 
serve to make a ‘flat situation still flatter,’ thereby leaving no alternative except complete socialization  
. . . .”). 
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The resulting reports, known collectively as the Viner Studies, outlined a 
comprehensive program for progressive tax reform.79 It was not a radical 
program. Indeed, in many respects it was conservative, driven by a commitment 
to revenue adequacy. The first and most important task of the tax system was to 
raise revenue. All other concerns—fairness, efficiency, or administrative 
convenience—were secondary. 
The Viner Studies argued for a broad expansion of the individual income 
tax.80 As then structured, the income tax was still a rich man’s burden, paid by a 
relative handful of Americans. That narrow focus satisfied certain definitions of 
social justice (especially among Democrats), but it made for a volatile revenue 
stream. By broadening the tax to include some of the middle class, the authors 
hoped (among other things) to make its revenues less susceptible to swings of 
the business cycle. 
This recommendation, and the rationale behind it, imply a distinctly old-
school view of fiscal policy. Treasury officials still considered revenue stability a 
cardinal virtue, since they were chiefly concerned with securing adequate 
revenue, even in the face of the depression. Champions of compensatory 
taxation might argue that lower revenues (and higher deficits) were a useful 
stimulant to economic activity, but Treasury tax experts weren’t buying it. 
Indeed, they remained suspicious of any effort to use the tax system as 
countercyclical device. 
The tax system, so the argument runs, may be employed to eliminate business cycles 
or at least to lessen their severity, by penalizing “over-saving” and encouraging 
consumption, by checking speculation, by favoring certain geographical or social 
classes at the [expense] of others, by encouraging business initiative, by discouraging 
“unwise” business expansion, and so on. Finally, there is always the plea for 
“redistribution of wealth” through the tax system.81 
While the use of federal tax policy for such purposes, the Treasury staffers 
concluded, was “not necessarily an evil,” it was still dangerous. Given the 
limited state of economic knowledge, policymakers were ill-equipped to pursue 
such ambitious designs. “We believe that at present not enough is known about 
the economic mechanism to warrant a conclusion as to whether, if saving is 
checked, certain advantages with respect to the business cycle will or will not 
follow,” they wrote. “Then there is always the troublesome problem of degree, 
and here even the primary effect of certain tax changes cannot be predicted.”82 
For instance, a discriminatory tax of twenty-five percent on income from 
 
 79. For a summary of the reports’ conclusions, see CARL SHOUP, THE FEDERAL REVENUE 
SYSTEM: FORWARD AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1934), available at http:// 
www.taxhistory.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23735/23735-1.htm. 
 80. ROY G. BLAKEY, FEDERAL REVENUE SYSTEM: FEDERAL INCOME TAX (CERTAIN PHASES) 
(1934), available at http://www.taxhistory.org/Civilization/Documents/Surveys/hst23737/23737-1.htm. 
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savings might, in fact discourage savings. But by how much? And how would 
that affect the business cycle? Economists could not provide an answer.83 
In other words, compensatory taxation made sense, in theory. But for those 
charged with crafting policy for real-world use, it was dangerous and untrod 
ground. Ultimately, the Treasury concluded, “[T]here is a heavy burden of 
proof to be borne by those who would attempt to use the tax system to 
influence decidedly the major economic currents of the country . . . .”84 And that 
proof was not yet forthcoming. 
Such comments reflected a very traditional view of taxation. And more 
generally, the Treasury experts (most of them economists but with a sprinkling 
of legal experts in the mix) took a similarly traditional line on expansionary 
fiscal policy more generally. They discouraged heavy reliance on borrowing and 
urged a program of heavy taxation to support emergency expenditures. “Too 
heavy and, especially, ill-advised taxes may be deflationary, may check 
recovery, and may [defeat] the purpose of all economic effort, including that of 
the Government,” they acknowledged. 85 But too much borrowing would be 
inflationary, raising doubts about the government’s commitment to sound 
finance. Lawmakers were simply compelled to raise taxes. “[P]ublic credit must 
be maintained at all hazards,” the Treasury staff concluded. “Such taxes as 
these are not popular and never will be popular, but real [statesmen] must face 
realities and, if necessary leave popular acclaim to history.”86 
Such traditional views notwithstanding, the Treasury experts did show some 
awareness of newer trends in public finance. In their discussion of the income 
tax, for instance, they reeled off a list of its virtues: 
In normal times it can yield an abundance of revenues; if properly handled in 
prosperous times it can yield enough more to build up reserves for the future or to pay 
off debts of depression periods. Those large income taxes, contributed by industry in 
boom times to pay off debts and build up reserves, may serve at the same time to 
stabilize business in several ways; they may lessen taxes for debt service in future 
depression periods. They may check the overextension of plant and unbalanced 
production that would follow unduly large profits and surpluses, and they may help to 
build up industrial and government insurance reserves that [may] steady purchasing 
power and decrease tax drains for relief purposes in bad times.87 
“Check the overextension of plant”? “Steady purchasing power”? Such 
terminology reveals a more than passing acquaintance with theories of 
compensatory taxation. But for Treasury tax officials, these were still distinctly 
secondary concerns—and not yet ready for real-world use, in any case. The 
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signal virtue of the income tax was its ability to raise ample revenue without 
violating norms of distributive justice. If the levy could also help the economy 
function more smoothly, then all the better. But taxes, they believed, should not 
be designed with such ancillary effects moved to the fore. 
IV 
THE NEW-DEAL EMBRACE OF COMPENSATORY TAXATION 
New Deal tax experts may have been skeptical of compensatory fiscal policy 
in 1934, but just three years later, they were unabashed enthusiasts. Their 
conversion was prompted by a change in economic circumstance, coupled with 
continuing intellectual ferment following the publication of Keynes’s The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Meanwhile, political and 
revenue imperatives prompted Roosevelt to champion yet another sweeping tax 
law, this time focusing on the taxation of corporate profits. The undistributed-
profits tax (UPT)—introduced in 1936 despite the vigorous complaints of 
business leaders—drew its root inspiration from theories of compensatory fiscal 
policy. But its political rise in 1935—and subsequent fall in 1937—turned 
principally on fairness concerns, not business-cycle regulation.88 
Nonetheless, the UPT proved pivotal in shaping attitudes toward 
compensatory fiscal policy—and countercyclical taxation in particular—within 
the Treasury Department. As the economy nosedived into a resurgent 
depression in 1937, and the New Deal lost its forward momentum, leaders of 
the Roosevelt Administration embraced compensatory fiscal policy. Treasury 
experts were no exception, and by 1937, they were quick to defend the UPT on 
countercyclical grounds, while also making the case for a broader compensatory 
system of taxation. 
A.  The Early New Deal and Compensatory Taxation 
As he approached the 1936 election, Franklin Roosevelt made room for tax 
reform on the crowded New Deal agenda. The Revenue Act of 1935, which the 
President championed vigorously, imposed heavy new taxes on the rich, raising 
rates for both income and estate levies. In general, he defended the measure as 
a blow for social justice, insisting that concentrations of wealth and economic 
power were inconsistent with modern American democracy. 
Such arguments carried the day, but in the flush of victory, Roosevelt 
appended an economic justification for his soak-the-rich tax reform. The 
purpose of the law, he told one correspondent, “is not to destroy wealth, but to 
create [a] broader range of opportunity, to restrain the growth of unwholesome 
and sterile accumulations and to lay the burdens of Government where they can 
best be carried.”89 This language echoed arguments for compensatory taxation, 
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especially of the progressive variety. But compensatory arguments for the 1935 
law were an afterthought; Roosevelt sought higher taxes on the rich for a 
variety of political and moral reasons, but regulating the business cycle was not 
a leading motive for the President or any of his chief advisers.90 The New Deal’s 
first real experiment in countercyclical taxation came the following year, when 
Roosevelt unveiled his proposal for a controversial tax on undistributed 
corporate profits. 
The UPT was not a new idea, having been championed by tax economists 
for more than a decade. But it made its New Deal debut during the 1932 
campaign, when several of Roosevelt’s key advisers—including Raymond 
Moley and Adolf Berle—suggested that a tax on undistributed corporate profits 
could help regulate the business cycle.91 Companies, they argued in a pivotal 
memo, had traditionally distributed profits by paying dividends to shareholders. 
Increasingly, however, many were choosing to retain their profits, “hoarding” 
cash in company coffers, where it sat unproductively. According to Moley and 
Berle, these retained profits had contributed to the depression by disrupting the 
natural flow of supply and demand, encouraging companies to overinvest in 
productive capacity and limiting the circulation of money among consumers.92 
To correct this tendency, Moley and Berle suggested that companies be 
taxed on some share of their undistributed earnings.93 An undistributed-profits 
tax could be levied on companies that failed to distribute a reasonable 
percentage of their annual profits. If made steep enough, the rates would force 
companies to disgorge their annual profits (though not their existing surpluses). 
This was a dramatic but not entirely novel proposal.94 An early version of 
the UPT had been implicit in the Civil War income tax, which taxed 
shareholders not only on dividends, but on their share of a corporation’s 
undivided profits.95 In the early twentieth century, lawmakers had revived this 
idea, adapting it to reflect the advent of a corporate income tax. During World 
War I, Treasury adviser Thomas S. Adams had recommended the UPT as a 
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matter of fairness. “[T]he undivided profits of a corporation should be taxed at 
the rates which would apply if such profits were distributed to the 
shareholders,” he wrote in 1918.96 In 1920, Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of the 
Treasury had also proposed a new tax on undivided profits, and the Joint 
Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, while eschewing a decisive stand, 
supported some version of the tax in the late 1920s. Meanwhile, the tax system 
already included a weak version of the UPT, although exemptions and 
exceptions had rendered it a dead letter.97 
Advocates of large-scale economic planning, like Rexford Tugwell, were 
among the most vocal proponents of taxing corporate reserves. Properly 
designed, Tugwell maintained, a tax on retained earnings would prevent 
corporate managers from investing too heavily in productive capacity. Like 
many of his contemporaries, Tugwell believed that overinvestment was a 
principal cause of the Great Depression. With easy access to investment 
capital—in the form of retained earnings—managers had made foolish 
investments. A tax on undistributed profits would prevent companies from 
expanding recklessly during prosperous years. If designed with a steep, almost 
punitive rate structure, it would force companies to part with their precious 
cash. Managers still intent on expansion would then be forced to seek funds in 
the open, and presumably more rational, capital market.98 
Many of Tugwell’s colleagues in the academy and liberal intelligentsia 
believed that companies were sitting on huge piles of cash. The Treasury 
Department estimated that from 1923 to 1929, corporations had retained more 
than forty-five percent of their total earnings.99 Some observers believed this 
propensity to retain earnings reflected the growing divide between ownership 
and management.100 In a 1932 study of corporate structure, Adolf Berle and 
Gardiner Means had stressed the size and importance of this gap. By 1930, they 
pointed out, most of the nation’s largest companies were controlled by 
managers, not owners or their direct representatives.101 And these managers had 
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their own interests and imperatives. Many were inclined to invest corporate 
income, even when prudence dictated otherwise. “Officers of a billion dollar 
corporation certainly enjoy higher incomes and greater social prestige, even if 
the rate of return on the invested capital is lower, than officers of smaller 
corporations that are very prosperous,” observed one economist.102 
Moley and Berle embraced Tugwell’s theory of excess investment. At the 
same time, they offered a proto-Keynesian case for the UPT. By forcing money 
out of corporate coffers and into the economy at large, they predicted, a tax on 
undivided profits would “liberate a tremendous amount of purchasing power.” 
Excess saving was a drag on the economy, and steep taxation on corporate 
reserves would turn sterile accumulations to more-productive use. Since 
inadequate demand had conspired with excessive supply to create the 
depression, the distribution of corporate profits might help turn the economy 
around.103 
The UPT quickly disappeared into the volatile policy process of the early 
New Deal. But some of the reformist arguments offered by Moley and Berle 
would reappear in the mid-1930s, as another group of policymakers adopted the 
UPT as its pet project. 
B.  An Experiment in Countercyclical Taxation 
For senior officials in the Treasury Department, revenue needs were a 
constant worry. In 1936, they became especially acute when the Supreme Court 
invalidated the processing tax associated with the Agricultural Adjustment Act. 
Tax experts working for Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau immediately 
cast about for ways to close the resulting budget gap.104 What, they wondered, 
should replace this highly productive consumption tax? They quickly settled on 
the undistributed-profits tax—thanks largely to the efforts of one person: 
Herman Oliphant, Treasury general counsel and one of the Roosevelt 
Administration’s leading champions of progressive tax reform. 
Oliphant had long favored a tax on undistributed corporate income. He 
worried incessantly about the power of big business, and his tax proposals were 
often designed to humble large companies. He was something of an “anti-
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truster,” sympathetic to the ideas of Justice Louis Brandeis and eager to 
disperse concentrations of economic power. He was not among the first rank of 
New Deal Brandeisians, which included Felix Frankfurter, Tommy Corcoran, 
and others, but Oliphant believed tax policy could be used to discourage 
monopoly and stem the concentration of wealth.105 Artfully employed, he 
contended, taxes could remake American society. 
Oliphant’s suspicion of concentrated economic power extended to 
individuals as well as to organizations. He worried that a handful of wealthy, 
well-connected oligarchs were dominating the economy. This concern had led 
him to champion steep new taxes on wealth and income; the progressive 
emphasis of the 1935 Revenue Act bore the hallmark of Oliphant’s soak-the-
rich ideology. In 1936, he built on this success by arguing that the UPT would 
tame not just large companies, but the men who ran them as well. By forcing 
the corporate elite to cede control over profits, the UPT would promote 
economic democracy. 
In 1935, Raymond Moley had convinced Roosevelt to table Oliphant’s plan 
for a UPT. Since writing his 1932 campaign memo recommending the tax, 
Moley had soured on the idea. By early 1935, he was warning Roosevelt that 
such a tax would penalize thrift, hamper recovery, and destroy business 
confidence. Roosevelt agreed to sideline the proposal, but his revenue message 
retained an oblique warning about the danger of retained profits.106 
In 1936, Oliphant revived his plan, and this time he had a revenue crunch to 
aid his cause. Moley had since parted ways with Roosevelt, and Oliphant 
quickly lined up support from several other presidential advisers, including 
Jacob Viner and Roswell Magill.107 One key Roosevelt adviser, however, was 
not enthusiastic: Henry Morgenthau. The Treasury Secretary was inclined to 
oppose the new tax, worried that its introduction—especially when coupled 
with repeal of existing corporate taxes—would threaten the stability of federal 
revenue. He also seemed to understand that the tax would prove highly 
controversial. And on this point, even Oliphant agreed. “If we have to fight,” 
Oliphant told his boss, “we might as well fight the people who are our enemies 
anyway.”108 
Oliphant’s pugnacity presaged a looming battle. While he supported the 
UPT for its potential to reform the economy, Oliphant now cast the tax 
principally in terms of fairness. The levy, he argued both publicly and privately, 
was a means to prevent wholesale tax avoidance among the nation’s very rich. 
His argument depended on the presumption that all taxes were ultimately 
borne by people, not companies. “When all is said, taxes come out of the 
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pockets of individuals,” he declared.109 And some of these individuals were not 
paying their fair share. The moral case for taxing retained profits was 
overwhelming, Oliphant later told the Senate Finance Committee. The injustice 
of the current tax structure “makes no other form of taxation at this juncture 
possible of defense.” 110 
As lawmakers sat down to consider the UPT, New Deal officials consistently 
offered fairness arguments for its passage. Issues of structural economic reform 
and compensatory relation of the business cycle were largely absent. Opponents 
of the UPT also left these issues largely unexplored, although they argued 
strenuously that the attempt to bolster fairness (an attempt they rejected on its 
own merits) was almost certain to cause widespread economic disruption. 
Ultimately, lawmakers passed a watered-down but still-important version of 
the UPT. And almost as quickly, they began to reconsider their decision. In 
mid-1937, the economy began a steep decline into a resurgent depression. The 
downturn was prompted, at least in part, by Roosevelt’s renewed commitment 
to fiscal austerity. The President had succumbed to Morgenthau’s persistent 
arguments for “sound” finance, calling for budget stringency throughout the 
government. The nation watched as expenditures declined and tax receipts rose. 
At the same time, the Federal Reserve tightened the supply of credit, and, soon 
enough, a resurgent depression had appeared.111 
In the face of the “Roosevelt Recession,” Morgenthau continued to argue to 
budget discipline. He believed that business required a demonstration of fiscal 
responsibility, especially after years of deficit finance. Outside the Administra- 
tion, meanwhile, critics were having a field day, many blaming the President’s 
tax policies—and the UPT in particular—for the recent downturn. Business 
leaders were solidly arrayed against the UPT, and lawmakers on Capitol Hill 
were giving serious thought to repeal. A few Administration figures urged 
reform, including Agriculture Secretary Henry Wallace, Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation chairman Jesse Jones, and even Federal Reserve chairman 
Marriner Eccles.112 Soon enough, Congress agreed. The Revenue Act of 1938 
gutted the UPT, leaving little more than a vestige. The Revenue Act of 1939 
finished the job, ending Roosevelt’s grand experiment in corporate (and 
compensatory) taxation. 
 
 109. Revenue Act, 1936: Hearing on H.R. 12395 Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 74th Cong. 889 
(1936) (statement of Herman Oliphant, General Counsel for the Treasury Department).  
 110. Id. at 890. 
 111. Herbert Stein points out that the changing fiscal picture resulted principally from introduction 
of the new Social Security taxes coupled with an end to the accelerated soldiers’ bonus. Roosevelt’s 
newfound commitment to spending restraint played a relatively minor role. See STEIN, supra note 1, at 
99–100. 
 112. Not surprisingly, Morgenthau was reported to be “extremely dubious” of the UPT. For 
Treasury plans to reform the tax, see CARL SHOUP, UNDISTRIBUTED PROFITS TAX RELIEF FOR 
SMALL CORPORATIONS (1937), available at http://www.tax.org/THP/Civilization/Documents/ 
UPT/HST8667/hst8667-1.html; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 97. 
THORNDIKE 9/4/2010 11:15:04 AM 
Winter 2010] THE FISCAL REVOLUTION AND TAXATION 119 
C.  Tax Experts and the Embrace of Compensatory Taxation 
The same recession that helped defeat the UPT also catalyzed support for it 
within the Treasury Department. More important, the downturn changed the 
way tax experts thought about compensatory taxation more generally. Armed 
with fresh economic theory, including the ideas Keynes had put forward the 
year before, these experts were now eager to make taxation an instrument of 
business-cycle regulation. 
In 1937, the Treasury Department’s tax staff took a hard look at tax reform, 
much as they had in 1934 under the direction of Jacob Viner and Roswell 
Magill. Again, they produced a series of major reports, collectively dubbed the 
Tax Revision Studies, that laid out of program of fundamental tax reform.113 But 
while the Viner Studies had been permeated by a sense of immediate crisis, the 
1937 reports took a broader, more contemplative view of the tax system. 
In some important respects, the conclusions of 1937 looked much like those 
offered three years earlier. The Treasury economists once again declared 
revenue adequacy the overriding goal of federal taxation. They repeated their 
recommendation that income taxes be given a bigger role in the overall revenue 
system, with lower exemptions bringing middle-class taxpayers within the grasp 
of this erstwhile rich-man’s tax.114 
But the Treasury economists of 1937—many of whom had also worked on 
the 1934 reports—broke with the Viner recommendations when it came to 
broad issues of compensatory taxation. Once leery of plans to make taxes a tool 
for macroeconomic regulation, they now urged lawmakers to do just that. 
Taxes, they argued, could help bring stability to an inherently unstable 
economy.115 
In general, Treasury staff argued, policymakers should not try to maintain a 
steady flow of revenue into the Treasury during economic downturns. “The 
tendency exhibited during the depression years to introduce a great variety of 
new excise taxes, and to raise the rates on old ones, to make up for the 
diminished receipts from direct taxes is not a wholesome one,” they wrote.116 
Instead, policymakers should devise a flexible revenue system whose receipts 
were expressly designed to vary over the length of the business cycle.117 
Annual variation in federal revenues was desirable, according to research 
director George Haas, as long as it derived from “a basically adequate and 
stable tax structure which relies heavily upon progressive direct taxes.”118 This 
statement represented a dramatic reversal from Treasury’s earlier position, 
which had emphasized the need for “sound” finance in the face of depression 
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deficits. And Haas justified it in distinctly Keynesian terms. During recessions, 
he explained, a stable tax system would produce a sharp decline in revenue, 
even as spending needs were likely on the rise. But the resulting deficit was no 
cause for alarm. Indeed, he assured his superiors that it would be “stimulating 
to the national economy.”119 
“In the opinion of an important body of present-day economists, a business 
depression is characterized by a lack of balance between saving and 
investment,” he explained.120 Worried about prospects for the future, people 
saved too much and invested too little. This left large stores of capital and labor 
unemployed. In such a situation, government should borrow the nation’s 
unused savings and increase spending immediately, thereby increasing national 
income and promoting recovery. “In this way,” Haas wrote, “during a period of 
abnormal unemployment, an unbalance of the Federal budget may be said to 
help to redress the unbalance of the entire economy.”121 
Policymakers should definitely avoid raising taxes in a depression, Haas 
wrote, at least for everyone except the rich. A tax increase on the poor and 
middle class (like the excise hikes of 1932) might raise revenue, but it would 
harm the nation’s economic well-being. Indeed, Haas contended, such an 
increase “only adds to the deflationary forces already operating upon private 
business.”122 
An increase in progressive taxes, however, might actually encourage 
recovery by freeing idle money from the hoards of wealthy taxpayers, who were 
naturally inclined to oversave. “Therefore, as the wealth of the community 
increases,” Haas wrote, “it may be increasingly necessary to reduce the 
potential savings of the wealthier members, among whom the propensity to 
save is greatest, and to direct such income to the poorer members.”123 
Income taxes, in conjunction with government spending, could accomplish 
this redistribution. But so, too, could certain taxes on corporate profits, 
including the UPT, that also reach idle savings. “There are good grounds for 
believing that there exists in this country a considerable stream of uninvested 
savings which prevent a full absorption of the potential products of industry,” 
Haas wrote. 124 A tax on undistributed profits would discourage shareholders 
(who tended to be rich) from saving too much within corporate coffers. 
In broad terms, the compensatory role of federal taxation was designed to 
help establish a healthy balance among consumption, savings, and investment, 
Haas concluded. Left unchanged, the existing tax system placed too heavy a 
burden on consumption through its numerous regressive elements. The 
prospect of social-insurance payroll taxes only made the situation more urgent. 
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A vast and involuntary increase in the savings to be made by members of the lower 
income groups under the Social Security Act might well have decidedly unfavorable 
and profound, economic repercussions if this volume of income withdrawn from 
current consumption were not offset in considerable measure by a reduction, through 
taxes levied to defray ordinary Government operating expenditures, in those segments 
of the income of wealthy individuals which would otherwise be saved by them.125 
One of the more-notable aspects of the Treasury program was its emphasis 
on tax-system stability, even within the context of compensatory taxation. All 
too aware of the inequities and administrative difficulties associated with 
frequent changes to the tax system, they stressed “the great desirability, on both 
economic and equitable grounds, of a stable tax structure.”126 This preference 
was a key element of the domesticated Keynesianism that later came to 
dominate fiscal policymaking. 
Taken as a whole, the Tax Revision Studies offered a powerful Keynesian 
case for compensatory taxation. They accepted the notion that taxes should be 
used to regulate the business cycle, and as justification they presented a more or 
less doctrinaire Keynesian interpretation of the depression. The studies even 
embraced (somewhat gingerly) arguments for redistributive taxation as a 
recovery measure—and possibly as a condition of continued economic stability. 
All this was quite a change from the relatively conservative policy 
recommendations formulated by the same tax staff just three years earlier in the 
Viner Studies. The fiscal revolution was moving quickly, at least among fiscal 
experts. 
V 
CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FISCAL REVOLUTION 
The New Deal’s legislative experiment with compensatory taxation was 
ephemeral, but its intellectual embrace of the idea proved durable. Indeed, by 
1938, the fiscal revolution was largely complete within the tax-policy 
community. To be sure, some members of this policy community remained to 
be convinced; elected lawmakers were particularly slow to embrace the 
desirability of deliberately unbalanced budgets, among other elements of 
revenue Keynesianism. But for key tax experts, the fiscal revolution ended at 
roughly the same time that the 1937 recession sent the New Deal itself into 
general retreat. 
In general, historians have minimized the influence of explicitly Keynesian 
ideas in the 1930s. Even after the “Struggle for the Soul of FDR”—Stein’s 
phrase for the concerted effort in 1937 to convert the President to Keynesian 
thinking—the New Deal’s embrace of countercyclical fiscal policy was a modest 
affair, constrained by economic and political realities, including Roosevelt’s 
waning influence over Congress in the late 1930s. Compensatory taxation, in 
particular, remained. 
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But if practitioners of high politics were still resistant to the Keynesian 
prescription for macroeconomic management, fiscal experts were not. Revenue 
Keynesianism had established a beachhead in various parts of the Roosevelt 
Administration by the late 1930s, but none more secure than its position in the 
Treasury Department’s tax division.127 
To be sure, the version of revenue Keynesianism adopted by New Deal tax 
experts relied heavily on the redistributive role of progressive taxation. In the 
late 1930s, the notion of countercyclical tax cuts—a fiscal tool that would 
emerge in postwar politics as a key element of domesticated Keynesianism—
remained in the land of economic theory, not political reality. As economist 
Robert Musgrave later recalled, expansionary tax cuts remained “unthinkable” 
in the late 1930s, not least because they would have delivered disproportionate 
benefits to wealthy taxpayers.128 
True revenue Keynesianism emerged only after the fiscal watershed of 
World War II. The vaunted transformation of the income tax from a “class tax” 
to a “mass tax”129 gave policymakers a crucial weapon in their countercyclical 
arsenal. Indeed, without a broad-based flexible revenue instrument like the 
income tax, compensatory taxation would have remained an intellectual 
curiosity, not a serious tool for economic policymaking. 
But the conversion of the tax experts was a crucial first step. Treasury 
experts played a vital role in shaping the wartime tax regime. Congressional 
leaders were intent on reclaiming their primacy in the tax-policy process, a role 
that Roosevelt had co-opted in the mid-1930s but relinquished in the latter 
years of the decade. But Treasury officials, with strong support from Roosevelt, 
still managed to make their plans for mass income taxation the bedrock of 
wartime taxation—and the durable regime it spawned. 
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